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The percentage statement has nothing to do with the rest of the statements, but clearly they are
on his mind.
"Mark has defended against this same argument already before the district court, and it is
frivolous for Stacy to continue to reiterate the same arguments before this Court."
(Respondent's briefp. 39) Neither the magistrate nor district courts ruled Stacy was frivolous.
The children have the right to appropriate child support. The true issue at hand is that Mark
does not believe that they do, and Mark's Answer to Petition (R., p. 72-74) perfectly backs up
this statement. In the Answer Mark admits that he and Stacy agreed to recalculate child support.
Then he denies Stacy's proposed $2,537 per month child support and the pro-rata percentage of
extra-curricular activity and health expenses, yet he fails to state a recalculated child support that
he deems appropriate and makes no statement of how he wishes to address extra-curricular
activity and health expenses. Finally he prays that the petition be dismissed. Apparently, $385
a month child support and Stacy paying 50% of extra-curricular activity and health expenses is
appropriate in his mind. Mark's income at time of divorce was at $300,000. (R., p. 27) At the
time of his Answer to Petition, September 2013 his income was $440,000, (R. p. 63) nearly a
50% increase. At time of trial Mark's income for 2013 was $550,000. (Tr. p. 23, L.15)
Brief Statement of Facts
Mark has an interesting way of coming up with some of his facts and omits facts that
don't serve him.

"The average income earned between 200 I and 2009 was $126,518.67 and

does not establish a high standard ofliving during the marriage." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5).
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Pointed out by Stacy at the district court appeal the $126,518.67 is an incorrect figure, he used
the wrong income in several instances, he decided the $600,000 income in 2000 should not be
included in the average income figure. (R. pgs.278, 326-327). Furthermore, Mark fails to take
into account the net proceeds from the sale of the California home in 2003 of$631,589. (Exhibit
12.)
His next fact is that Stacy created Exhibit 35 to show the allegedly high standard of living
during the marriage. (Respondent's Brief, p. 6) At trial, Mark never made one objection to the
figures on Exhibit 35. Exhibits 11 and l lA were produced for discovery back in the Fall of
2013, and those exhibits are the same data as Exhibit 35, spending from 2006 through 2009 out
of Quicken. (Tr. p. 64., L.2-8, p. 83, L. 3-16.)

He had ample time look at the figures to discern

if they looked reliable. He was to request the data contained in the Quicken database under
I.R.C.P. 34(b) ifhe wished to authentic Quicken. It was not Stacy's burden to provide that for
him.

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 34(b). Procedure.
(1) The request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff
after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the
summons and complaint upon that party. The request shall set forth the items to be
inspected either by individual item or by category, and describe each item and category
with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and
manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. To obtain discovery of
data or information that exists in electronic or data storage devices in any medium, the
requesting party must specifically request production ofsuch data and specify the form
or manner of delivery in which the requesting party wants it produced. (Emphasis added)
He ignored the proper rules of procedure leaving his objection to trial. "It would seem that trial
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is the proper time and place for attorney's to make objections to evidence." (Respondent's brief
p. 7)

This is a rather frightening statement. The goal of a child support case should be to

settle the case as quickly as possible for the sake of the children involved. Mr. Welsh actually
cancelled the settlement meeting set the week before trial. (Tr. p. 97, L. 1-17)
The District Court Erred in Affirming: that the Magistrate Did Not Commit Error
Barring Evidence Per Rule 1006
Mark quotes a portion of a statement made by Stacy, "[t]he pre-trial conference is the time and
place for a Judge to ask for exactly what he needs in order to make a fair determination of child
support ... " and goes on to say that Stacy cites no case, rule or statute. (Respondent's Brief, p.
10). This is the complete statement:
"The pre-trial conference is the time and place for a Judge to ask for exactly what he needs
in order to make a fair determination of child support pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d), so as to
prevent undue waste of time at trial and excessive trial expense" (Appellant's Briefp. 13)
Right after Stacy cites a case, "EDMUNDS v. KRANER•l42 Idaho 867, 877 (Idaho 2006)
speaks about the importance of the pretrial conferences and also about securing the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding pursuant to I.R.C.P. !(a):
Our rules of civil procedure and the express purposes behind our discovery rules likewise
recognize the court's authority to limit the number of expert witnesses. Rule I6(d) (4)
provides that a court may limit the number of expert witnesses prior to trial. Rule l(a)
requires that the rules of civil procedure "be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Our
discovery rules were designed to prevent surprise at trial, Pearce v. Ollie, 121
Idaho 539,552,826 l'.2d 888, 901 (1992), and discovery rules regarding expert
witnesses were designed to promote fairness and candor, see Radmer, PO Idaho at 89.
813 P.2J at 9011. Effective cross-examination and rebuttal of expert witnesses
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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requires advanced preparation and knowledge of that expert's testimony. Id. Neither
effective cross-examination nor effective discovery designed to achieve "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action" can take place when one party is allowed
to disclose an oppressive number of expert witnesses and the trial court refuses to
consider limiting expert testimony. St. Alphonsus's statement that they really only
disclosed three expert witnesses should not have come at the appellate level, but should
have been dealt with at an early pretrial conference.

At the very least the trial court should have considered the Edmunds' request to limit the
number of experts as a discovery issue and examined the purposes behind our discovery
rules when ruling on the motion. Ideally, the lower court should have held a
conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d) to discuss limiting the number of experts and
determine more fully on which issues these experts would be expected to testify in order
to comport with the purposes behind expert witness discovery and to prevent possible
discovery abuses. Idaho trial courts are expected to effectively and actively manage
discovery to achieve the purposes of the discovery rules and to reach a "just, speedy,
and inexpensive" determination of the issues. Therefore, this Court reverses the district
court's denial of the Edmunds motion to limit the number of expert witnesses and
remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (Bold emphasis added)"
(Appellants Brief p.
Stacy's attorney's fees for this case were so high that she could no longer afford to retain Mr.
Bevis for this appeal, and has been forced to argue this case prose." (Appellant's Briefp. 13, 14)
"Stacy thinks that the magistrate court should have instructed her as to exactly what
evidence she was supposed to present at trial in order to sustain her request to be awarded child
support over and above the Guidelines amount." (Respondent's Briefp. 10). No. Stacy does not
think that statement nor did she write it. She stated, "The pre-trial conference is the time and
place for a Judge to ask for exactly what he needs in order to make a fair determination of child
support pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(d), so as to prevent undue waste of time at trial and excessive

trial expense" (Appellant's Briefp. 13)
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule I6(d). Final Pre-Trial Procedure - Formulating
Issues.
A pre-trial conference shall be held in any action if requested by any party in writing at
least 20 days before trial, or if ordered by the court at any time, and the court may direct
the attorneys for the parties, or any party appearing without an attorney, to submit a
pre-trial memorandum containing substantially the information enumerated in Rule 16(e)
and to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid
unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses and the disclosure of the identity of
persons having knowledge of the relevant facts and who may be called as witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to be
used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; and
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
After the conference, the court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the
parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to
those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when
entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to
prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial
calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may
either confine the calendar to jury actions or to nonjury actions or extend it to all
actions. http:; www.isc.idaho.gov/ircpl 6d

"Stacy blames the magistrate court for not telling her what to present at trial ... "
(Respondent's Briefp. 10) Stacy does not blame the magistrate. At pre-trial Stacy's counsel
stated that there was a budget. He did not explain what kind of budget. The Magistrate
responded, Well I'm only worried about the budget during the marriage, how much of the child's
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expenses during the marriage, what they're used to during the marriage. Stacy's attorney stated
it'saprettyhighstandardofliving. (CORR. Tr.,p.15,L.23-p.16,L.15.) Stacy's counsel
also stated that the standard ofliving was from $200,000 during the marriage. That's what I
have in my file. (R., pp.217, 351.) Stacy is frustrated by the situation. He stated three times
that he was only concerned with the budget during the marriage. It seems that there should be
some accountability on the part of a magistrate. He abused his discretion and the district court
allowed it.
"Stacy's argument with regard to Exhibits 11 and l lA is not properly before this Court as
she did not raise issue with regard to Exhibits 11 and l lA in her appeal before the district court."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 11) The argument for these Exhibits is exactly the same as for Exhibit
35. These exhibits were properly preserved for appeal. Exhibit 35 was not. Exhibits 35, 11,
and l lA are expense budgets during the marriage from 2006 through 2009, the last four years of
the marriage, prepared by Stacy by grouping Quicken records by Quicken category and by year.
(Tr. p. 64, L. 2-8, p. 83, L. 3-16) She listed all three exhibits in order to avoid confusion for this
Court because the only exhibits that this Court has to look at are Exhibits 11 and l lA. Stacy
doesn't need all three admitted. Exhibit 35 is preferable because it is sorted by category type
and the other two are sorting alphabetically by category and harder to digest.
All three Exhibits were excluded from evidence under Rule 1006 of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence because the paper bank statements had not been provided to Mark by Stacy. Stacy did
not use the paper bank statements to populate Quicken. She used the internet, and electronically
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downloaded the banking transactions. (Tr. p, 83, L. l

~

p. 84, L. 25 and Tr. p. 76, L. 1-15) The

original banking transactions are in Quicken. The originals are not the paper bank statements.
Stacy asked if she could explain to the magistrate how the exhibits for this case were created and
he replied No. (Tr. p. 73, Ls. 11-23.) Mark conveniently left that out of his brief to this Court,
literally ending the testimony cited right before the magistrate said no to Stacy's request.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 13). The magistrate didn't want to hear anything that may render his
ruling incorrect. This is similar to what happened in Carr v. Edgar•335 P.3d 578, 583 (Idaho
2014 ), where this same magistrate refused to permit that introduction of evidence that would
overturn his ruling. He was reversed.
Stacy explained in her brief how categories work in Quicken. (Appellant's Briefpgs.
15-17). Page 17 states, " ... when dealing with Quicken categories one needs to know what
category was assigned to each banking transaction if one wants to prove or disprove a Quicken
report by Category. It is also clear if one looks at Exhibits 11 and 11-A that this is true. The
figures on that report are grouped by the Category. So in order to authentic the evidence that
Stacy presented one must have access to the original Quicken records which are stored solely
with the Quicken software program itself." There is no case law in Idaho on the Quicken
program or its records. Stacy found a case IN RE NWFX INC.,267 B.R. 118, (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 2001), that did specifically speak about Quicken categories and she referenced it in the
attempt to help explain how Quicken categories work. She did not reference it as any type of
proof of the admissibility of Quicken records under the rules of evidence.
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That case states, "A check was written for $41,600.00, and it was coded in the Quicken
Records category as 'Legal Fees' ... 42 "

"

42

Check number 2707 payable to the Rose Law Firm in the

amount of $41,600.00 and dated June 15, 1992."

(Appellant's Brief page 16) The footnote 42

lists the banking institution data: check munber, payee, amount, and date. To that banking
institution data a category is then assigned/coded in the Quicken records, and it becomes the
complete Quicken record. The Quicken category is not on a banking transaction. It is unique
to the Quicken Program.
Evidently that was not clear to the Respondent's attorneys because their brief to this
Court states, "Without the underlying bank records, Mark would have no way to verify the
amounts, the dates, and most significantly, the categories for which Stacy assigned certain
expenditures." (Respondent's Briefp. 12) With the underlying paper bank records Mark would
have still have no way to accurately verify the categories to which Stacy assigned certain
banking transactions because the categories are not on the bank statements. Again the original
underlying bank records live in Quicken not on a piece of paper. For the paper bank statements
to be the originals Stacy would have had to manually input the bank record data from them by
hand, and she did not do that because there is so much room for user error.
The original source of all of the data that appears on Exhibit 35 is Quicken itself, and is a
combination of an electronic bank transaction plus a Quicken category. The sustained objection
for Exhibit 35 was that Stacy did not provide Mark the bank statements. (Tr. p. 76, L. 21 - 77.,
L. 4) The bank statements are not the original, and are in fact useless to authenticate Exhibit 35
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because they do not contain the Quicken category. The original is the banking transaction plus
the Quicken category and it lives in Quicken. Quicken was made available to Mark back in
March of 2013. Stacy sent Mark an email on March 18, 2013 notifying Mark he could look at
the Quicken records ifhe wanted to see them. Mark never responded. (Exhibit 39) Quicken
was also made available at the deposition.
MR. BEVIS: Judge these were produced on October 14, 2013. So he's had plenty of
opportunity to request these back-up documents. That further, in that regard, at his
- at her deposition she was asked about those. She clearly revealed in her
deposition on November 14, 2013, that there were Quicken records that supported
Exhibits 11 and 11-A. And as a result they have been made available. They
haven't requested them.. (Tr., p. 96, L.198 - p. 97, L. 7.)
Mark's attorney also asked Stacy about Quicken at the deposition.
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: At the deposition, Stacy, were you asked by Mr. Welsh about
Quicken?
A. I was asked about MR. WELSH: Judge, I'm going to object
THE WilNESS: - Quicken
MR. WELSH: - irrelevant whether I did or didn't ask her the question. It's not
relevant.
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: And did he - at that point in time, did he THE COURT: No.
Q. BY MR. BEVIS: - did he ask to see the THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. (Tr. p. 77, L. 16-p. 78, L. 3.)
The sustained objection for Exhibit 35 was that Stacy did not provide Mark the bank statements.
This was magistrate error because the bank statements were not the original. The magistrate
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would not admit Exhibit 39, the email regarding Quicken from Stacy to Mark. This was also
error. Finally the sustained objection regarding Mr. Welsh asking Stacy about Quicken is also
error. The sustained objections were to prevent the magistrate from having to overturn his
ruling which would have allowed Exhibit 35 into evidence. Again this is a strikingly similar
situation to what he did in Carr v. Edgar.
The district court allowed all of these sustained objections on Exhibit 35 to stand. His
opinion on Exhibit 35 states that, "Exhibit 35 was a summary in that it was based upon the
appellant's input of information from various bills and statements. See Trial Transcript at 84. (R.
364) Tr. at 84 states that Stacy got the information into Quicken by downloading it off the
internet from the bank statements, not that she input it from various bills and statements. His
opinion says that Stacy had not made available for examination or copying, or both, the originals
or copies of the underlying records at a reasonable time and place to the respondent prior to trial.
She did not have them with her in court at the time the objection to the exhibit was made. The
trial court ruled this was not timely and precluded the summary. The appellant offered to
produce the records. The appellant has not shown this was an abuse of discretion considering the
stage of the trial and the delay that would have been necessary to evaluate them." (R. 364) The
district apparently forgot his cogent comment at hearing regarding bank statements.
THE COURT: The one question I had is, we're talking about records during the marriage.
And, of course, community property stayed, both parties are equal managers of the
community property. And your client would be, theoretically, the custodian of records, as
well as his former wife. It seems a little different twist on an exhibit where both parties,
at least legally, have the same right to the records. (Appeal Tr. p. 31,32)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

12

The district court made the same error that the magistrate court did assuming that the originals
were paper statements. Exhibit 35 should have been admitted into evidence.
Mark argues in his brief that "[e]ven if Exhibit 35 had been admitted it contained no
relevant or probative information because what the parties spent during 2006 and [through] 2009
is not germane in light of the actual income received by the parties. The income in those years
did not exceed $300,000 (with the exception of2009 when it was $305,012). Therefore, had the
magistrate court admitted Petitioner's Exhibits 11, I IA, and 35, it would not have changed the
outcome of the case in light of the facts that the parties had to borrow funds to cover their
expenses and the income levels during those years." (Respondent's brief p. I 7, 18) There is no
case law cited to support this argument.
It matters not that income was below $300,000 in those years. And in fact income was

2008: $297,960 2007: $252,150, 2006: $216,328 (Exhibit 10) The borrowing of funds was a line
of credit and a loan from Mark's dad in 2005 and 2006. (Tr. p. 78, L. 4-15) There is nothing
wrong with having a line of credit and a loan from Dad. The line of credit payments were a
mere $6,000 a year (R. p. 25) There is nothing to indicate that they were paying anything to
Mark's father in the record. What the parties spent from 2006 - 2009 is exactly what the
magistrate asked for at the pre-trial. It is relevant and it is very probative.
Exhibit 35/11/1 lA shows that for 2008 and 2009 when income was right at $300,000
what the expenses for a family of four were. It also breaks out children's expenses in great
detail. What it does completely standing on its own is that it shows that for this family the child
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support calculation of $1,726 per month at $300,000 of income is not appropriate for these
children. An upward deviation is required.
The District Court Erred in Affirming That The Exclusion Of Evidence Under The
New I.R.F.L.P Rule 102 .. B.2 Was Correct

This case was heard under the new Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure, ("I.R.F.L.P")
which Stacy discussed at length in her brief. (Appellant's Briefpgs. 22-25) There is a new
brand new rule in the I.R.F.L.P., Rule 102, which includes Rule 102.B. The Idaho Supreme
Court Website is clear on why this new rule was put into place in family law cases.
Rule 102.B is designed to be simpler and easier to apply than the more formal and
technical rules in the IRE which often operates to restrict the admission of relevant
evidence. The less formal new rule should facilitate the presentation of relevant evidence
at trial for all parties http:/.'www.isc.idaho.gm/rules/irflp/IRFLP FAQs 4-14.pd[
The Respondent addressed this rule for this Court only in part, Rule 102.B.2. The entire Rule
l 02.B needs to be read to understand its entire meaning:
I.R.F.L.P Rule 102.B. Applicability of Idaho Rules of Evidence.

I. Upon notice to the court filed by any party within thirty (30) days after a response or
other responsive pleading is filed, or, if none, within forty-two (42) days from the filing
of the motion or petition, or such other date as may be established by the court, any party
may require strict compliance with the Idaho Rules of Evidence, except as provided in
Rule 102.B.3.
2. If no such notice is filed, all relevant evidence is admissible, provided, however, that
the court shall exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, lack of reliability or failure to
adequately and timely disclose same. This admissibility standard shall replace rules 403,
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602, 801-806, 901-903 and 1002-1005, Idaho Rules of Evidence, except as provided in
Rule 102.B.3. All remaining provisions of the Idaho Rules of Evidence apply.
3. Regardless of whether a notice is filed under Rule 102.B.1, records of regularly
conducted activity as defined in Rule 803(6), Idaho Rules of Evidence, may be admitted
into evidence without testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness as to its
authenticity if such document (i) appears complete and accurate on its face, (ii) appears to
be relevant and reliable, and (iii) is seasonably disclosed and copies are provided at time
of disclosure to all other parties.
The record shows through testimony at trial that the records in Quicken met the standards of
regularly conducted activity according to this new rule. Stacy used Quicken from 2006 through
2009 to balance the checkbook, and Mark was aware that she used Quicken. (Tr., p. 64, Ls.
4-23) Stacy had been operating Quicken prior to 2006, she used to do Mark's QuickBooks for
his business, and she has been doing this type of work for 14 years or longer. (Tr., p. 99,
Ls.17-22.) Stacy worked for a financial management firm and was a computer programmer
there, and Quicken is a computer program. (Tr., p. I 00, Ls. 5-11.) Stacy operated Quicken
appropriately and accurately to produce Exhibits 11 and 11-A, and 35... (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 12-16.)
There were no objections at trial to any of this testimony. Neither Mark, the magistrate court,
nor the district court ever state anywhere in this record that Quicken records regularly conducted
to balance a family checkbook fail to satisfy Rule I 02.B.2.

There is no case law on this to date.

Exhibit 35 should have been admitted pursuant to Rule I 02.B.2
The District Court Erred in Affirming the Magistrate Court's Award of Child Support.
Its Decision Was Not Based On Substantial Evidence
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The magistrate erred because he did not consider the spending during the marriage due to
his improper exclusion of Exhibit 35. Mark asserts that because income from 2006 through
2009 did not exceed $300,000 per year there is no basis to exceed the recommended support
under the Guidelines. (Respondent's Briefp. 18,19)

This makes no sense at all. The income

figures at the time of trial were $550,000 and $38,000, clearly over $300,000. It doesn't matter
what the incomes were from 2006 through 2009. Exhibit 35 is a standard of living report from
during the marriage. He then asserts that Stacy was trying to show with the chart below that
there was substantial money left over after expenses, yet has totally failed to account for the fact
that the income figures are pre-tax. (Respondent's Brief p. 19) What this chart shows is that
there was money left over to pay taxes, but that was not the point of this chart. The point of this
chart was to show what the average monthly expenses were. This chart shows that expenses
were very stable over a four year period even though income increased. This chart shows that
they spend nearly the same amount of money on the children over a four year period. This chart
shows that they were spending way more than $1,726 per month at $300,000 of income for 2008
and 2009. This chart shows that even when income was lower in 2006 and 2007 they were still
spending about the same amount each month. This chart shows that the child support
calculation in this case is too low and a deviation was required. Stacy had to use data from
Exhibits 11/l IA because Exhibit 35 was improperly excluded. Exhibits 11/1 lA were preserved
for appeal which means this Court can look at the data contained in them. The data is the same
for Exhibits 35/11/l IA.
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Spending on the Children During the Marriage 2006-2009
2007
2008
2009
2006
305,012
223,873
252,150
297,960
Incon:e
145,012
157,402
162,349
Expenses
146,089
135,611
160,000
Diflerence
77,784
94,748
Monthly Expenses
$
12,174 $
13,117 $
13,529 $ 12,084
Chik:I Support Ordered: $1,726 0) exactly $300,000 ofcombined incon:e
Mark asserts that Stacy needed to show that the children's current needs exceed the
recommended child support under the Guidelines. (Respondent's Brief p. 19)

The children are

entitled to child support as if the marriage remained intact. Mark presented no evidence of his
current standard ofliving which would have been the standard of living if the marriage remained
intact. Given that his income was $550,000 it is extremely doubtful the standard ofliving
would have decreased. Also given that the children are much older, eating more, wearing adult
size clothing, the standard of living would have increased most very likely.
Garner v. Garner, 158 Idaho 932,354 P.3.d 494 (2015) states the amount of support
indicated by the Guidelines "is the amount of support to be awarded unless evidence establishes
that amount to be inappropriate." Exhibit 35/11/1 lA establishes that amount to be inappropriate
at $300,000 of income so it would also be inappropriate at $550,000.
Mark says there was no evidence at trial to establish the I.R.F.L.P 126(1)(4) factors would
warrant an award of additional support above the Guidelines income schedules. (Respondent's
Brief p. 22) Exhibit 35/11/11 A is factor c. One can plainly see from that Table that the child
support calculated warrants an upward deviation. He says there was no evidence presented at
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trial that would support the conclusion that the children's needs were so exceptional as to require
that additional support be paid, especially in light of the fact that the children are with the parties
on an equal basis. (Respondent's Briefp. 22) The only thing that matters with the children
being with the parties equally is that food will be less, water and electricity will be slightly less,
that's about it. The child's needs were not exceptional they were average for the income bracket
that they were in. They are just way higher than what the child support calculation computes.
Housing expenses for 2009 were at $5, I 00 per month, and there is nothing super excessive there.
(Exhibit 11)
Mark makes this huge deal about Stacy ignoring the marriage from 2001-2005. Stacy
addressed the standard of living during the marriage for the records that she had in her Quicken
database. They began in 2006 explained at trial. She can't make stuff up for those other years.
In terms of low incomes from 2001-2005, Stacy has previously addressed this in this reply.
Income in 2000 was over $600,000. Net proceeds of the sale of a home in 2003 was over
$600,000. Mark in his brief chose to ignore those two figures. They had plenty of money to
live on, and have a high standard of living.
Mark states Stacy insinuates that there is a huge disparity in their homes, and goes on to
state that they are similar in size and that it is difficult to see much of disparity. But he also
states hers was $430,000 and she put $60,000 into it and his was $600,000. (Respondent's Brief.
P. 26) I guess when you are as rich is Mark is a $110,000 price differential doesn't appear to be
a disparity. This may be an indictor of why he doesn't mind throwing thousands upon
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thousands of dollars away on attorney's fees rather than sitting down with Exhibit 35/11/1 lA and
determining a fair child support figure for his children. He is a Chartered Financial Analyst and
the co Chief Investment Officer, he is really the one that is the expert here on budgets.
Mark states that the magistrate considered each and every factor in his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law. (Respondent's Brief p. 27) He did consider them but he did not consider
them all correct! y.
In regard to Rule 126(J)(4)(b), the magistrate states, "Crucial in the Jensen case as in the
case at bar are the present expenses of the parties and how it relates to their respective incomes.
In the Jensen case the parties presented extensive evidence on the parties' present expenses which
allowed the court to analyze the parties respective resources. However here that is not
possible." (R. 195) If a factor is that crucial to this rule then the rule should explicity state that
it is a requirement and the current wording does not do that.
126(1)(4). Income over $300,000. The Guideline Income schedules are not a limitation on
the award of child support for combined Guidelines Income above $300,000 per year.
The support based on the first $300,000 shall be calculated by these Guidelines in
proportion to the relative incomes of the parents. In determining any additional support
for Guidelines Income above $300,000, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
which may include:
So if a Judge thinks that any of those factors are crucial he should make it known prior to his
ruling. After all these are cases about child support. It's a Judge's duty to protect the rights of
the children not the parent. "In Idaho, "[in] any proceeding where child support is under
consideration, child support shall be given priority over the needs of the parents" Garner v.
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Gamer, #41898, 2015 Opinion No. 72, July 22, 2015, p.6. In Stacy's case the ruling came down
to current needs of Stacy not being before the magistrate. 'The parties incomes were disclosed
however no current expenses or obligations of either party were disclosed for this court to
determine even tangentially, the possible disposable income of either party. Without evidence as
to expenses or obligations this court could not, without speculation determine if the children's
standard of living increased, decreased or stayed the stay." (R. p. 198). Stacy thinks that the
magistrate could have made a very educated evaluation as to the current standard ofliving of the
children. Stacy testified that she was spending her property settlement and her savings and her
husband Dan was also contributing in order for the children to retain the standard of!iving that
they had enjoyed prior to alimony ending. (Tr. p. 90,91) Stacy had to spend the alimony to
keep up with the standard ofliving the children enjoyed during the marriage.
In regard to Rule 126(J)(4)(c), the magistrate states

Standard of living of the children during the marriage.
Attached to the memorand um of understanding and incorporated into the decree of
divorce was a listing of the expenses of the parties and their children as
"non-discretionary spending" and "discretionary spending" under a common title of "joint
expense worksheet".
Since both parties stipulated to split these costs during the time Mark paid alimony (see
memorand um of understanding) these expenses clearly show the standard of living the
childrenwere used to during the marriage.
The enly evidenee presented at the tfial that these ei,jlenses eeHtimie sn tedaj· are listed
in Petitiener's Ei,hieit #3 and ef these Staey testified enly a peFtien ef the eest ef e)[hieit
#3 'Neala aetaally ee inearreEI.
Beth Staey and Mark testified as te vaeatiens taken with the ehildren eat neither party
presented any eests related te these endeavsrs.
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In 2009 the parties standard of living was set forth in the parties "Joint Expenses
Worksheet" attached to their memorandum of understanding incorporated into their
decree of divorce.
Assuming Mark's $300,000.00 of income was the parties sole income, and their expenses
were as set forth in the joint expenses worksheet then the parties had disposable income
of$182,354.00 without considering any deductions for taxes.

New Staey and Ii.er Bevr li.B.saand Ii.a-Ye petem:ial iBeeme ef $139,983.00 (li.B.saands
iBeeme) $34,128.00 (Marie's pay-mem: te Staey fer steek) $38,000.00 (Staey's imputed
iBeeme) and $1,731.53 per meB.tli. er $20,778.30 per year iB Bew ehild SlipfleFt fer a tetal
ef$232,889.3e iB fiB.aB.eial resel!fees.
Marie elearly has mere iBeeme at $550,000.00 per year.
Hewever Beith.er f)arty presem:ed te the eemt their eJ(fleB.ses.
Beeause Beith.er party Ii.as preseBted e-YideBee eeBeemiag their respeetive Beeds and
ealigatieBs this eellft eannet determiae if the standard efliving eitperieBeed ay the
ehildreB dllriBg tb.e marriage Ii.as aeeB retIBeed, iBereased er has stayed the same.
Staey testified that Marie has Bever deBied her a refj_11est fer meBey fer eittra ellrrielllar
aetiv-ities. (R. 195, 196) (strikethroughs added)
Rule l 26(J)(4)(C) is the standard ofliving the child enjoyed during the marriage. It does not
state compare the standard of living during the marriage to the current standard of living. Nor
does it state list the standard ofliving during the marriage and the current standard of living.
Mark himself stated this in his brief. "Rule I 26(J)(4 )( c) takes into consideration the standard of
living during the marriage, not the standard ofliving of the parties at the time of the
modification." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5). As such there should not need to be any comparison
to current standard ofliving. Standard ofliving the child enjoyed during the marriage should be
analyzed on its own.
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The district court stated, "He reviewed the applicable factors in relation to the evidence
presented. There is no identification of a specific factor tied to an error by the magistrate. The
magistrate did not abuse his discretion." (R. p. 368) Stacy respectfully disagrees with the district
court. The magistrate did make errors on factors B and C. The decision of the district court
should be reversed by this Court.
The District Court Erred In Affirming That Stacy's Lack Of Veracity Was
Unimportant To The Magistrate's Decision

"Stacy's argument with regard to this particular issue on appeal is not entirely clear. The
district court held that the magistrate's reference to Stacy's veracity did not amount to any bias to
Stacy." (Respondent's Brief, p. 28) Stacy believes that it did amount to bias to Stacy. He went
out of his way to make up a story in order to put her veracity into question, but it was entirely
false. See Appellants Brief pp. 32-36. Why was he so irritated that he did that? And wouldn't
this irritation flow through to his ruling? Crafting a false statement is slander, and and it matters
not if what he did would have changed the outcome of the case. He violated the Judicial Code
of Conduct.
In reading through the Code the magistrate also violated it by completely losing his
temper, and speaking in an extremely demeaning manner to Stacy.
THE COURT: Dont give me a look like that. You don't talk while we're discussing something
here okay? You '11 only respond to questions; understand? (Tr. p. 71, L.16-18).
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Finally Stacy thinks that he may have violated it a third time. The magistrates wife was
the Executive Director at the University ofldaho from September 2008 - July 2014. Mark's
partner Bill Gilbert was Chairman of the University ofldaho Foundation in 2008. He has also
served as President. He is an Emeritus Director. J. Richard Rock another partner of Mark's as
well as co-Chief Investment Officer with Mark, has served as Director of the University of Idaho
Foundation. In the 2008 Annual Report his name is listed in donating $500,000 - $999,999,
Bill Gilbert's is listed as donating $5,000 - $9,999. It makes much more sense now how the
magistrate new so much about these two partners at Caprock at the pre-trial conference. Corr.
Tr. p. 17, L. 11 - p. 19, L. 9) Stacy does realize that this is a very small town and that everyone
has connections to the University of Idaho, but this is over the top. Mark's partner donating
such a large some of money to your wife's place of work? The magistrate should have
respectfully removed himself from the case. This information is available as public records on
the internet.
Stacy is aware that generally new issues cannot be raised on appeal, but Stacy did not
have this evidence at the time of the trial hearing, so she could not give it Mr. Bevis to present at
district appeal. And she didn't have it when she wrote the Appellant Brief for this Court.
Tax Exemptions

Stacy is aware that is perfectly fine for magistrate to follow the Guidelines. He clearly
did not abuse discretion by following the rules. But the magistrate also had broad discretion,
and so does this Court. See Stacy's brief for the argument.
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The District Court Erred By Not Awarding Attorney's Fees To Stacy Pursuant to I.C. §
32-704, I.C §32-705, I.C §12-121 and Section XIII Of The MOU Attached To The Decree
Mark incorrectly asserts that Stacy was able to pay her attorney fees as they came do.
Stacy stated that she had paid $10,000 and that she still owes more money for attorney's fees.
(Tr. p. 91, L. 6-11.)
Mark time and again in his brief and now in the section has stated that Stacy filed the
request to modify child support, like this is some sort of punishment she has inflicted unto Mark.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 36.) Child support recalculation was agreed upon by both parties and
was mandated by the MOU attached to decree to be recalculated.

Stacy just read another new

case Kesting v. Kesting, Docket No. 42875, a case involving a mutually agreed upon alimony
settlement in a domestic relations case.

As in Kesting, Stacy and Mark were free to consider

factors not included in Idaho Code 32-705, (Kesling p. 7, footnote 2) which they did, specifically
the recalculation of child support after alimony ended December 31, 2012. Their MOU is an
enforceable domestic relations agreement. Stacy is not an attorney she is at a deficit here, but it
seems that she could have filed to have that agreement enforced after reading Kesting. She has
been unable to do any further research because this brief is due.
When Stacy went to see Mr. Bevis at the request of Mark, his first question to her was
have you filed a Petition to Modify because until you do, Mark doesn't have to pay any
retroactive child support. Stacy had no idea about this. In January of2013 Mark had told her
that he would paying child support back to January 1, 2013 no matter how long it took to arrive
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at the new support figure. He didn't hold to his word. He started paying April 1, 2013 as the
magistrate ordered. So it is actually a very good thing that Mark did ask her to seek counsel or
who knows how many more months may have gone by. Child support had to be recalculated
because of Mark's decision with alimony and low child support. Clearly he was not going to
file a Petition to Modify, so Stacy had to.
"However an award of child support per the Guidelines of $1,726 plus coverage of all
those other expenses was not enough for Stacy; she wanted more." (Respondent's Brief, p. 37)
Health insurance is at $4,500 a year, pre tax dollars. The kids are extremely healthy, and neither
has had braces. Kate wears glasses. Mark has eye insurance. He pays for the children's cell
phones on his business account and gets a great deal. He offered 100% of his son's lacrosse
versus 94% or what was ordered. And he only offered 75% for his own daughter's acting.
Mark's offers were really not all that generous and do not replace basic child support. $1,726 a
month is not an appropriate child support figure for these children.
Mark's refusal to accept the initial child support of$2,537 back in March of2013
is what drove this case to court. (Respondent's Brief, p. 37) That is a true statement. If Mark
had accepted it, there would be no court. Even that $2,537 figure is meager given the standard
of living the children enjoyed during the marriage. Still Stacy offered that right before that trial
and Mark rejected it.
Mark did attempt to resolve matters without going to trial, but those negotiations
obviously failed. (Respondent's Brief, p. 37) The record shows that they had a discussion
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January 2013. It does not state what the discussion was about except that this Court knows that
Mark asked Stacy to hire an attorney to discuss imputed income. Mark offered no settlement
negotiation in his Answer to Petition. Mark cancelled the settlement negotiation the week
before the trial.

There is nothing in the record stating that Mark attempted to resolve matters

without going to trial. In fact Mark told Stacy specifically that he was planning on going to trial
in August of 2013.
Stacy's arguments as to why she is entitled attorney's fees are in her brief.

However

after writing this reply she wanted to also point out that the district court cited Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6,205 P.3d 650,655 (2009) in his opinion.

When an exercise of discretion is involved, this Court conducts a three step analysis (1)
whether the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Cameron, 130 Idaho at 902,950 P.2d at 1241.

Stacy does not believe that the Magisrate met

this three pronged analysis. Respectfully the district court ruling should be reversed by this
Court.
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Mark is Not Entitled to an Awarded Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred in Defending
Against Stacy's Appeal

Neither the magistrate nor district court awarded Mark's attorney's fees. Stacy did not
bring this case frivolously. She had to file a Petition to Modify or the children's child support
would be left at $385 per month. The record shows that there was nothing on the table from
Mark in which to have settlement negotiations. Stacy is not inviting this Court to second guess
the district court on conflicting evidence. There was no conflicting evidence or testimony. The
district court stated at the hearing: Which was another question, assuming it's interpreted that -in reading the transcript, I had a hard time finding any place where there appeared to be any
significant impeachment of either party. They both seemed to testify pretty straightforward. (P.
29, L. 20-25).
Stacy did not fail to make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of discretion.

The

magistrate court here did not do an exceptional job of carefully and thoughtfully deciding this
case. And the district court ruling was rather sparse. There should be no award of attorney's
fees under Idaho Code 12-121.

Mark complains that Stacy presents the same argument that she put before the magistrate
court and the district court. As he stated in his brief new issues cannot be argued on appeal.
Stacy believes that she did make many cogent arguments justifying a reversal of the district
judge's decision affirming the magistrates ruling.
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Stacy did present evidence of the specific factors germane to warranting a deviation from
the Guidelines under I.R.F.L.P 126(J)(4)(a)-(g).
Conclusion

The record demonstrates that magistrate court did not properly address the issues and
findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Exhibit 35 should have been entered into
Evidence, under I.RE 1006 and I.R.F.L.P 102.B.2. The magistrate court abused its discretion
when it denied Stacy her request to deviate from the guidelines and award support over the
calculated amount. The district court improperly affirmed the magistrate ruling. Stacy's brief
does demonstrate reversible error by the district court. Respectfully, Stacy requests this Court
to reverse the district court's Opinion on Appeal. Stacy also respectfully requests this Court to
award her attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho code 32-704, 32-705, 12-121 and 12-107;
Idaho Appellant Rules 35(b)(4), 35(b)(5), and 41; and Idaho Rule of Procedure 908.
With all sincerity Stacy did not bring this case to this Court frivolously. She has been a
diligent, studying the law as much as she can, to come up with cogent arguments and cite them if
she can find citations.

She knows how overworked and underpaid this Court (and all courts)

are. She has a great deal of respect for the time and effort you and your staff expend serving
justice. Stacy is not here to waste your precious time. She is here because she believes that
that ruling should be reversed. She is here because it is important that her children see her
fighting for a cause, standing up for justice, and fighting the fear that has come with arguing this
prose.
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It is rather fascinating to Stacy that Mr. Welsh, the magistrate judge, and the district
judge all were a part of the Jensen case twenty years ago, and now this strikingly similar case is
here before this Court. Stacy would like to make a personal comment regarding that case that
may come as a surpnse.
I believe in some sort of type of cap. I was shocked when I found out that parties can go
back and modify child support simply because an ex-spouse is making more money. I am sure
there are circumstances that warrant that, but in a case of high income to begin with, if an
appropriate child support award is set according to the standard of living the children enjoyed
during the marriage then that child support figure should last the duration of child support. Of
course the parties would really have to prepare for all expenses that will come forth as the child
grow and incorporate those. Like Mark and I didn't think about our kids driving and now we
are arguing over how to deal with that. I do think with everything being electronic now, it will
be much easier for the parties to get a true accounting of what that standard ofliving is. And I
do think there is a market for a Child Support Quicken Expert in the field of law. A third party
that has no ties that takes your electronic data and creates budgets. And what would be amazing
is if all that data could then be used to start to compile a database which could eventually be
worked into the child support calculation. It would be pretty ironic if after all of this I ended up
with a career.
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Dated this

/'i5'#} day of May, 2016.

Stacy Loughmiller, prose
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18 h day of May, 2016, I served a true and correct copy

of the foregoing REPLY TO THE RESPONDENT;S BRIEF, by cause to be place a copy thereof
in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
Stanley W. Welsh
COSHO HUMPREY, LLP
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 9518
Boise, ID 83707-9518

State of Idaho

)

) ss.

County of Ada

)

and
Stacy Loughmiller being sworn, deposes and says that I am the appellant in the above-entitled appeal,
belief.
and
e
knowledg
my
of
that all statements in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best

Signature of Appellant
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